Privacy Harms

U.S. v. Google LLC: An overview of the landmark antitrust case and its impact on consumer privacy, A.I., and the future of the internet.

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U.S. v. Google LLC: An overview of the landmark antitrust case and its impact on consumer privacy, A.I., and the future of the internet.

By William Simpson

 

I. Intro

The ongoing antitrust case against Google alleging anticompetitive conduct relating to the company’s search engine could, in the near term, result in a breakup of the company or, alternatively, indicate that existing antitrust law is ill-suited to engage outsize market shares in the digital economy.[1] On a broader scale, this case could have major effects on consumer privacy, A.I., and the character of the internet going forward. The consequences could be, in a word, enormous.

 

II. Background

 

In October 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a complaint against Google, alleging that Google violated the Sherman Antitrust Act[2] when it:

  • Entered into exclusivity agreements that forbid preinstallation of any competing search service;
  • Entered into tying arrangements that force preinstallation of its search applications in prime locations on mobile devices and make them undeletable;
  • Entered into long-term agreements with Apple that require Google to be the default general search engine on Apple’s popular Safari browser and other Apple search tools; and
  • Generally used monopoly profits to buy preferential treatment for its search engine on devices, web browsers, and other search access points, creating a continuous and self-reinforcing cycle of monopolization.[3]

The DOJ’s complaint concludes that such practices harm competition and consumers, inhibiting innovation where new companies cannot “develop, compete, and discipline Google’s behavior.”[4] In particular, the DOJ argues that Google’s conduct injures American consumers who are subject to Google’s “often-controversial privacy practices.”[5]

In response, Google refutes the DOJ’s argument, deeming the lawsuit “deeply flawed.”[6] “People use Google because they choose to,” says a Google spokesperson, “not because they’re forced to or because they can’t find alternatives.”[7] Challenging the DOJ’s claims, Google asserts that any deals that it entered into are analogous to those a popular cereal brand would enter into for preferential aisle placement.[8]

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Privacy in Virtual and Augmented Reality

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Privacy in Virtual and Augmented Reality

Devin Forbush, Christopher Guay, & Maggie Shields

A. Introduction

            In this paper, we set out the basics of Augmented and Virtual Reality.  First, we discuss how the technology works and how data is collected.  Second, we analyze what privacy issues arise, and specifically comment on the gravity of privacy concerns that are not contemplated by current laws given the velocity and volume of data that is collected with this technology.  Third, the final section of this paper analyzes how to mitigate these privacy concerns and what regulation of this technology would ideally look like.  Through the past decade, the advent of augmented reality (AR), mixed reality (MR), and virtual reality (VR) has ushered in a new era of human-computer interactivity.  Although the functions of each reality platform vary, the “umbrella term” XR will be used interchangeably to address concerns covering all areas of these emerging technologies.[1]  The gaming community might have initially popularized XR, but now, broad industries and economic sectors seek to impose the new technologies in a variety of contexts: education, healthcare, workplace, and even fitness.[2]

B. Augmented and Virtual Reality Background

Augmented Reality is “an interface that layers digital content on a user’s visual plane.”[3]  It works by overlaying certain images and objects within the users’ current environment.[4]  AR uses a digital layering which superimposes images and objects into their real world environment.[5]  Software developers create AR smartphone applications or products to be worn by users, such as headsets or AR glasses.[6]  In contrast, Virtual Reality seeks to immerse users within an “interactive virtual environment.”[7]  VR seeks to transport the user into a completely new digital environment, or reality where users can interact with, move within, and behave as if they would within the real world.[8]  To enter VR, a user wears a head-mounted device (HMD) which displays a “three-dimensional computer-generated environment.”[9]  Within the environment created, the HMD uses a variety of sensors, cameras, and controls to track and provide sights, sounds, and haptic response to a user’s input.[10]  Mixed reality offers a combination of virtual reality and augmented reality.[11]  In function, mixed reality creates virtual objects superimposed in the real world, and behaves as if they were real objects.[12]

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Adding Insult to Injury: How Article III Standing Minimizes Privacy Harms to Victims and Undermines Legislative Authority

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Adding Insult to Injury: How Article III Standing Minimizes Privacy Harms to Victims and Undermines Legislative Authority

By Kristin Hebert, Nicole Onderdonk, Mark A. Sayre, and Deirdre Sullivan

ABSTRACT

            Victims of data breaches and other privacy harms have frequently encountered significant challenges when attempting to pursue relief in the federal courts. Under Article III standing doctrine, plaintiffs must be able to show a concrete and imminent risk of injury. This standard has proved especially challenging to victims of privacy harms, for whom the harm may be more difficult to define or may not yet have occurred (for example, in the case of a data breach where the stolen data has not yet been used). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in TransUnion appears on its fact to erect an even higher barrier for victims of privacy harms to seek relief. In this article, the authors provide a background on Article III standing doctrine and its applicability to cases involving privacy harms. Next, the recent TransUnion decision is discussed in detail, along with an overview of the evidence that TransUnion has failed to resolve the ongoing circuit splits in this area. Finally, the authors propose a test from the Second Circuit as a standard that may be able to resolve the ongoing split and support increased access to the courts for the victims of privacy harms.

 

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